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THE CRA IMPLICATIONS OF PREDATORY
LENDING
Kathleen C. Engel and Patricia A. McCoy*
INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, policymakers, communities, and industry have re-
garded the Community Reinvestment Act ("CRA")1 as a positive
mandate for banks and thrifts2 to do good by increasing investment
in low- and. moderate-inc6me ("LMI") neighborhoods.' The spe-
cific purpose of CRA is to encourage federally insured depository
institutions "to help meet the credit needs of the local communities
in which they are chartered consistent with the safe and sound op-
eration of such institutions."4
When Congress enacted CRA in 1977, it was in response to the
prevailing belief that under-investment was a root cause of blight
in LMI neighborhoods. Congress hoped to reverse this blight by
creating incentives for banks to increase their lending activities in
low-income communities. At the time, it was inconceivable that
LMI neighborhoods might eventually have too much credit in the
form of abusive mortgages that would trigger a surge in foreclo-
sures and force homeowners to forego heat and medical care to
pay their mortgages and thus keep their homes. However, by the
late 1990s, the unimaginable had happened. Predatory mort-
gages5-exploitative high-cost loans to gullible borrowers-were
* Kathleen C. Engel is Assistant Professor of Law at Cleveland-Marshall Col-
lege of Law, Cleveland State University. Patricia A. McCoy is Professor of Law at
Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland State University. We extend special
thanks to Rick Carnell and our research assistant, Melissa Horn.
1. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2908 (2001).
2. Henceforth, we use the term "bank" to denote both banks and thrifts.
3. For CRA purposes, LMI borrowers are those borrowers whose household in-
comes are less than eighty percent of the local median family income. LMI neighbor-
hoods are census tracts with median family incomes that are less than eighty percent
of the median income in the metropolitan area. ROBERT E. LITAN ET AL., THE COM-
MUNITY REINVESTMENT AcT AFTER FINANCIAL MODERNIZATION: A BASELINE RE-
PORT 2 (2000) [hereinafter BASELINE REPORT].
4. 12 U.S.C. § 2901(b) (2001).
5. Elsewhere, we have defined predatory lending as a syndrome of e~xploitative
loan practices involving one or more of the following five problems:
1. loans structured to result in seriously disproportionate net harm to
borrowers;
2. rent seeking that is harmful to borrowers;
3. loans involving fraud or deceptive practices;
1571
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXIX
ravaging inner cities and newspaper headlines across the country
were carrying accounts of foreclosures against low-income people
of color and the elderly.
In this article, we seek to understand the intersection between
CRA and predatory lending by answering the following questions:
does CRA reward banks for engaging in predatory lend-
ing or activities that indirectly support predatory lending?
do federal subsidies indirectly support predatory lending?
should CRA create disincentives to banks that engage in
or provide indirect support for predatory lending?
should CRA be extended to impose anti-predatory lend-
ing provisions on non-bank lenders, 6 including non-bank
affiliates and subsidiaries of banks?
is there a role for CRA to play in rewarding bank activi-
ties that combat predatory lending?
In examining these questions, we are mindful that CRA is a lim-
ited and imperfect tool for achieving community reinvestment. In
particular, CRA raises controversial issues, regarding the efficient
allocation of credit, competitive parity, safety and soundness, and
regulatory taxation.7 Despite its flaws, CRA has established a
beachhead for community development finance across the country
and has become institutionalized at major banks. Furthermore,
having survived the enactment of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of
1999 intact, albeit modified, CRA is here to stay for the time
being. 8
Just as there are challenges to the utility of CRA in general,
there are some who contend that CRA is an inappropriate tool to
combat predatory lending. Thus, a threshold question is whether
there are legitimate justifications for using CRA to address preda-
tory lending. We have identified two such justifications that we de-
4. other instances of lack of transparency in loans that are not actionable
as fraud; and
5. loans that require borrowers to waive meaningful legal redress.
Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law and
Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming 2002).
6. Throughout this article, the term "non-bank lenders" refers to lending entities
that are not federally insured depository institutions.
7. See generally Patricia A. McCoy, Banking Law Manual: Federal Regulation of
Financial Holding Companies, Banks and Thrifts § 8.04 (2d ed. 2001 & cum. supps.)
[hereinafter Banking Law Manual].
8. Pub. L. No. 106-102 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801-6810 (2001)).
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velop more fully infra. The first justification stems from the CRA's
goal of encouraging banks to serve the credit needs of their com-
munities. If CRA is creating incentives for banks to engage in
predatory lending, then CRA is actually defeating one of its stated
goals. Our second justification arises from the fact that banks are
the recipients of special government privileges in the form of exclu-
sive charters, federal deposit insurance and so forth. These subsi-
dies are considered part of the rationale for imposing CRA
obligations on banks.9 If banks use these privileges to harm the
communities they serve, there is a role for CRA in scrutinizing
bank activities. 10
We divide this article into three parts. In Part I, we outline the
relevant provisions of CRA. In Part II, we consider how CRA-
covered lenders may enable predatory lending, either directly or
indirectly. We also discuss the relationships among CRA, federal
subsidies and predatory lending. In Part III, we address whether
there are sufficient justifications for employing CRA to penalize
lenders that engage in predatory lending. Ultimately, we conclude
that CRA involvement is justified and make specific
recommendations.
I. APPLICABLE PROVISIONS OF THE COMMUNITY
REINVESTMENT ACT
CRA requires federal banking regulators "to encourage [feder-
ally insured depository] institutions to help meet the credit needs
of the local communities in which they are chartered consistent
with the safe and sound operation of such institutions."11 CRA has
two principal enforcement mechanisms: CRA examinations and
regulatory review of applications for expansion.
The first enforcement mechanism consists of CRA examinations.
In CRA, Congress directed federal bank examiners to "assess an
institution's record of meeting the credit needs of its entire com-
munity, including low- and moderate-income neighborhoods, con-
sistent with the safe and sound operation of such institution."12
Federal examiners evaluate a bank's community reinvestment ef-
forts in three separate areas: lending (the "lending test"), invest-
9. See, e.g., Allen J. Fishbein, The Community Reinvestment Act After Fifteen
Years: It Works, But Strengthened Federal Enforcement is Needed, 20 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 293 (1993).
10. Of course, these justifications apply solely to insured depository institutions.
11. 12 U.S.C. § 2901(b) (2001).
12. 12 U.S.C. § 2903(a)(1) (2001).
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ments in community development (the "investment test"), and
retail depository services (the "service test"). 13 Institutions receive
CRA ratings that can range from "outstanding" or "satisfactory" to
"needs to improve" or "substantial noncompliance. ' 14 Those ex-
amination ratings, plus the "public" section of the examination re-
port, are available to -the public. 15 Unlike depository institutions,
non-bank affiliates of banks do not undergo CRA examinations
unless they volunteer to do so.
CRA's other enforcement mechanism consists of applications for
expansion. These applications are divided into two types: (1) appli-
cations for deposit facilities; and (2) applications to become finan-
cial holding companies and applications by financial holding
companies and national banks to commence new financial activi-
ties or acquire companies engaged in financial activities.
Applications for deposit facilities include applications for a bank
charter or deposit insurance; applications to open or close a
branch; applications to relocate a home office or a branch; applica-
tions for a merger, acquisition or consolidation; applications to ac-
quire another bank's liabilities; and applications to acquire an
insured bank. 6 When reviewing applications for deposit facili-
ties, 17 federal bank regulators must take institutions' CRA per-
formance into account. The public may lodge CRA protests and
agencies have discretion to deny applications or place conditions
on approval due to CRA concerns."8 The public does not have
13. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. §§ 228.21(a)(1), 228.22-228.24 (Federal Reserve Board).
14. 12 U.S.C. § 2906(b)(2) (2001); see also 12 C.F.R. pt. 228 app. A (Federal Re-
serve Board). Well over ninety-five percent of institutions receive grades of "satisfac-
tory" or "outstanding." BANKING LAW MANUAL, supra note 7, § 8.03[1][b][i].
15. 12 U.S.C. § 2906(a)(2), (b)(2) (2001).
16. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2902(2)-(3), 2903(a)(2) (2001); see also 12 C.F.R. § 228.29(c)
(Federal Reserve Board).
17. CRA defines an application for a deposit facility to include a "charter for a
national bank or Federal savings and loan association; (B) deposit insurance in con-
nection with a newly chartered State bank, savings bank, savings and loan association
or similar institution; (C) the establishment of a domestic branch or other facility with
the ability. to accept deposits of a regulated financial institution; (D) the relocation of
the home office or a branch office of a regulated financial institution; (E) the merger
or consolidation with, or the acquisition of the assets, or the assumption of the liabili-
ties of a regulated financial institution; ... [and] (F) the acquisition of shares in, or the
assets of, a regulated financial institution requiring approval under section 3 of the
Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 or section 408(e) of the National Housing Act."
12 U.S.C. § 2902 (2001).
18. 12 U.S.C. § 2903 (2001).
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standing to sue to enjoin bank mergers or other applications on
CRA grounds. 9
Applications to become financial holding companies and appli-
cations by financial holding companies and national banks to com-
mence new financial activities or acquire companies engaged in
financial activities receive different CRA treatment. Under the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, such applications must be de-
nied where any of the holding company's banks or thrifts has a
CRA rating of less than satisfactory.z Conversely, where a parent
company's depository institutions all have CRA ratings of at least
satisfactory, such applications cannot be denied on CRA grounds.21
Regulators have no discretion and CRA does not allow protests by
members of the public to such applications.
II. DEFINING THE PROBLEM
A. Direct Involvement by Banks in Predatory Lending
Banks can directly participate in predatory lending by originat-
ing or brokering predatory loans. Currently, both origination and
brokerage activities may qualify for CRA credit even when they
involve predatory lending.
There is a great deal of uncertainty regarding the extent to which
banks originate predatory loans.22 As we discuss infra, banks have
significant disincentives to originating subprime, including preda-
tory, loans.23 Although theoretically the disincentives outweigh the
19. See Inner City Press v. Bd. of Governors, 130 F.3d 1088, 1089-90 (D.C. Cir.
1997) (per curiam); Lee v. Bd. of Governors, 118 F.3d 905, 910-1.1 (2d Cir. 1997).
20. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1843(1), 2903(c)(1) (2001).
21. See BANKING LAW MANUAL, supra note 7, § 8.03[1][b][ii].
22. There is a pressing need for empirical work on this subject. Without an accu-
rate understanding of the extent and nature of banks' involvement with predatory
lending, it is difficult to assess the need for and appropriateness of any remedial
proposals.
Analyzing 2000 data reported under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA),
the Department of Housing and Urban Development identified 185 lenders whose
business focus was subprime mortgage lending. 116 (63 percent) were independent
mortgage companies. 31 (17 percent) were non-bank affiliates and only 38 (20 per-
cent) were depository institutions or their direct subsidiaries. 6,423 depository institu-
tions filed HMDA reports in 2000. There are likely other banks in addition to the 38
reported that do some subprime lending, even if it is not their business focus. See
Memorandum from Division of Research and Statistics to the Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System, Jan. 15, 2002, at tbl. 1-4.
23. In most cases, predatory loans form a subset of the market for subprime loans.
The subprime market offers loans with higher interest rates that are suited for individ-
uals with blemished credit, limited income, or unconventional sources of income.
Subprime lenders charge higher interest to defray the higher risk of default. See, e.g.,
DErs OF THE TREASURY AND HoUs. AND URBAN DEV., CURBING PREDATORY
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incentives, there is anecdotal evidence that certain regulated de-
pository institutions have originated predatory loans. For example,
numerous borrowers have sued the failed subprime lender Supe-
rior Bank,24 alleging that the bank engaged in predatory lending.2 5
The plaintiffs have alleged that Superior encouraged them to as-
sume loans they did not need or could not afford, and engaged in
various forms of fraud. 6 If Superior was making predatory loans,
it could have received CRA credit for these loans under the lend-
ing test.
When banks serve as loan brokers, they take borrowers' applica-
tions and perform various settlement functions, without assessing
the creditworthiness of the applicants. Sometimes broker banks
fund subprime loans for a brief period before assigning the loans to
the originating lenders. Other times the broker banks do not fund
the loans at all.27 For the purpose of the CRA lending test, banks
can ask examiners to take into account the loans that they
brokered and briefly funded. Likewise, banks whose brokerage ac-
tivities are limited to accepting applications and performing settle-
ment functions can include these activities under the CRA service
test. Lastly, banks can ask that their mortgage brokerage services
be considered part of their community development service.28
HOME MORTGAGE LENDING 28 (2000) [hereinafter HUD-TREASURY REPORT].
Many subprime loans are legitimate. Only those that display one or more of the five
characteristics listed in note 5, supra, are predatory in nature.
Predatory loans come in numerous varieties, including high-cost mortgages, auto
loans, payday loans, credit card debt, and other unsecured consumer loans. Our focus
will be on home mortgages secured by first or junior liens on the borrowers' homes.
This is because the consequences to homeowners and society of default and foreclo-
sure are particularly devastating.
24. Federal regulators seized Superior Bank in July 2001. See Hearing on the Fail-
ure of Superior Bank, FSB, Hinsdale, Illinois: Hearing Before Senate Comm. on
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. (2001) (statement of John Reich,
Director, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation) [hereinafter Reich Testimony];
Kathleen Day, A Practice That Lends Itself to Trouble; Superior's Failure Spotlights
Banks That Court High-Risk Borrowers, WASH. PosT, Aug. 21, 2001, at El.
25. See Reich Testimony, supra note 24. It is difficult to know whether Superior
was an outlier or if, in fact, banks are originating predatory loans across the board.
26. See id.
27. See Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, Community Reinvest-
ment Act: Interagency Questions and Answers Regarding Community Reinvest-
ments; Notice, 66 Fed. Reg. 36,620, 36,628 (July 12, 2001) [hereinafter Interagency
Questions].
28. See id.
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B. Indirect Involvement by Banks in Predatory Lending
There are numerous ways in which banks can indirectly support
predatory lenders. They can purchase predatory loans as invest-
ments, either as assignments of loans originated elsewhere or by
buying securities backed by predatory loans.2 9 If and when banks
purchase predatory loans, they may be entitled to CRA credit
under the lending test if the loans fall within CRA guidelines. 30
Similarly, when banks purchase securities backed by predatory
loans made to LMI borrowers, they may receive credit under the
investment test.31
Banks also finance non-bank subprime lenders, through ware-
house lending facilities and other working capital loans 32 and
through loan guarantees in the form of letters of credit. In addi-
tion, banks serve as underwriters, trustees, registrars and paying
agents for securitizations of subprime loans, some of which may be
predatory.33 These bank activities raise CRA implications because
some of the activities receive explicit federal guarantees, while
29. See also HUD-TREASURY REPORT, supra note 23, at 37, 45-46 (citing the vari-
ous roles that regulated institutions can play in subprime lending).
30. See Community Reinvestment Act Regulations, 66 Fed. Reg. 37,602, 37,604
(Dep't of Treasury et al. July 19, 2001) (joint advance notice of proposed rulemaking)
[hereinafter CRA ANPR]. It is possible for banks to originate predatory loans and
then sell the predatory loans among themselves, which would enable them to be con-
sidered for CRA credit for originating the original predatory loans and then for
purchasing predatory loans originated by other institutions. Id.
31. See Interagency Questions, supra note 27, at 36,635.
32. See, e.g., First Union Corp., Charlotte, N.C.; Wachovia Corp. Winston-Salem,
N.C., 87 Fed. Res. Bull. 683, 696 (Oct. 2001); Firstar Corp., Milwaukee, Wis.; U.S.
Bancorp, Minneapolis, Minn., 87 Fed. Res. Bull. 236, 248 n.64 (Apr. 2001); The Chase
Manhattan Corp., New York, N.Y.; J.P. Morgan & Co., New York, N.Y., 87 Fed. Res.
Bull. 76, 87 n.36 (Feb. 2001); Mizuho Holdings, Inc. (In Formation), Tokyo, Japan, 86
Fed. Res. Bull. 776, 780 n.24 (Nov. 2000); see also MARK A. PINSKY & VALERIE L.
THRELFALL, NAT'L COMMUNITY CAPITAL CORP., THE PARALLEL BANKING SYSTEM
AND COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT 7-8 (1996); JANE D'ARISTA & TOM SCHLESINGER,
ECON. POL'Y INST., THE PARALLEL BANKING SYSTEM 25 (1993); Hala Habal, As
Conti's Loans Come Due, Bankruptcy Seen on Horizon, AM. BANKER, Aug. 19, 1999,
at 3 (describing bank letters of credit and other credit facilities to Contifinancial and
rival United Companies Financial Corp.); Heather Timmons, Debt Clock Running as
Contifinancial Seeks Equity, AM. BANKER, May 13, 1999 (same).
33. See, e.g., First Union Corp., Charlotte, N.C.; Wachovia Corp. Winston-Salem,
N.C., 87 Fed. Res. Bull. 683, 696 n.64 (Oct. 2001); Firstar Corp., Milwaukee, Wis.; U.S.
Bancorp, Minneapolis, Minn., 87 Fed. Res. Bull. 236, 248 n.64 (Apr. 2001); The Chase
Manhattan Corp., New York, N.Y.; J.P. Morgan & Co., Inc., New York, N.Y., 87 Fed.
Res. Bull. 76, 87 n.36 (Feb. 2001); Wells Fargo & Co. San Francisco, Cal., 86 Fed. Res.
Bull. 832 (Dec. 2000); Mizuho Holdings, Inc. (In Formation), Tokyo, Japan, 86 Fed.
Res. Bull. 776 (Nov. 2000); Order Approving an Application to Become a Bank Hold-
ing Company and Notices to Acquire Nonbanking Companies (Deutsche Bank AG,
Frankfurt am Main, Germany), 85 Fed. Res. Bull. 509 (July 1999).
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others may benefit more generally from federal subsidies. Explicit
subsidies arise, for example, when subprime lenders obtain financ-
ing through commercial paper placements guaranteed by letters of
credit issued by banks.34 Conventional letters of credit issued by
insured banks qualify for up to $100,000 in federal deposit insur-
ance.35 Past failed bank resolution methods that protected unin-
sured creditors in bank insolvencies, send an additional signal that
the uninsured balances of bank letters of credit may receive de
facto protection as well.36 Banks can accordingly charge lower fees
for those letters of credit. The possibility that banks are receiving
CRA credit for indirectly supporting predatory lending, and that
federal subsidies may be facilitating predatory lending, requires
that we consider utilizing CRA to deter abusive lending practices.
C. Steering of Prime Borrowers to Subprime and
Predatory Loans
One of the most troubling conclusions to emerge from the re-
search on the subprime market is that substantial numbers of cus-
tomers who qualify for prime loans are steered to costlier subprime
loans that should be reserved for customers with weak credit rat-
ings.37 Mortgage brokers have strong incentives to engage in steer-
ing due to "yield spread premiums. ' '38 These are premiums lenders
34. PINSKY & THRELFALL, supra note 32, at 13.
35. See FDIC v. Phila. Gear Corp., 476 U.S. 426, 430-40 (1986) (explaining that
standby letters of credit, however, do not qualify for deposit insurance); BANKING
LAW MANUAL, supra note 7, § 11.06[2][a].
36. See BANKING LAW MANUAL, supra note 7, §§ 15.05[3][a][i], 15.06[2].
37. For instance, in 1996, Freddie Mac concluded that ten to thirty-five percent
of subprime borrowers qualified for prime-rate loans. See FREDDIE MAC, AUTO-
MATED UNDERWRITING: MAKING MORTGAGE LENDING SIMPLER AND FAIRER FOR
AMERICA'S FAMILIES ch. 5 & nn.5-6 (Sept. 1996) [hereinafter FREDDIE MAC,
AUTOMATED UNDERWRITING], www.freddiemac.com/corporate/reports/moseley/
mosehome.html. Fannie Mae's President Franklin Raines has said that up to half of
all subprime mortgages are eligible for purchase by Fannie Mae as prime mortgages.
See HUD's Regulation of the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae)
and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac), 65 Fed. Reg.
65,044, 65,053 (Oct. 31, 2000) [hereinafter HUD Housing Goal Rules].
Steering could also take place within the various subcategories of subprime loans,
which are rated along a spectrum of A-, B, C and D loans. See HUD Housing Goal
Rules, supra, at 65,053. Because the dividing lines among those subcategories are not
as well-defined as the dividing line between A and A- loans, however, our sole focus
here is on steering of prime-eligible customers to subprime loans.
38. Cf Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), Statement of Policy
1999-1 Regarding Lender Payments to Mortgage Brokers, 64 Fed. Reg. 10,080 (Mar.
1, 1.999) (noting that yield spread premiums might be illegal where mortgage brokers
receive additional fees for convincing borrowers to accept higher rates).
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pay mortgage brokers if they persuade borrowers to accept higher
interest rates even though the lenders would, if pressed, grant the
loan at lower rates.39 Unsuspecting borrowers typically never
know that they are paying these premiums. Under the Truth in
Lending Act,40 for example, lenders do not have to include yield
spread premiums in the calculation of finance charges, even though
the cost of the premiums is passed on to the borrowers.41 Similarly,
39. See, e.g., HUD-Treasury Report, supra note 23, at 40; NINA SIMON, PREDA-
TORY LENDING FROM AROUND THE COUNTRY: A BROAD RANGE OF TOOLS 22-23.
In a recent economic analysis, Professor Howell Jackson concluded that yield spread
premiums "serve only to [benefit] mortgage brokers," not consumers, and levy "im-
plicit interest rates [that] are absolutely outrageous." See Hearing on "Predatory
Mortgage Lending Practices: Abusive Uses of Yield Spread Premiums" Before the
Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 107th Cong., 2d Sess. 3
(2002) (testimony of Prof. Howell E. Jackson) [hereinafter Jackson Testimony], avail-
able at banking.senate.gov/02_01hrg/010802/jackson.htm (last viewed Mar. 27, 2002);
see generally Howell E. Jackson & Jeremy Berry, Kickbacks or Compensation: The
Case of Yield Spread Premiums (Jan. 8, 2002), available at www.law.harvard.edu/
faculty/hjackson/jacksonberry0l08.pdf (last viewed Mar. 28, 2002).
40. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667f (2001).
41. See, e.g., RALPH J. ROHNER & FRED H. MILLER, TRUTH IN LENDING 121, 187-
88 (2000); Kenneth M. Lapine, Referral Fees and Other Compensation Issues Under
the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974, in WILLIAM H. SCHLICHTLING ET
AL., BANKING LAW (1998). Courts are divided over whether yield spread premiums
are prohibited kickbacks or legitimate payments for goods and services under the
Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601(b)(2), 2607(a),
(c) (2001). Compare Culpepper v. Irwin Mortgage Corp., 253 F.3d 1324 (11th Cir.
2001) (upholding class certification in case challenging yield spread premiums as
RESPA violations), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 930 (2002); Culpepper v. Inland Mortgage
Corp., 132 F.3d 692 (11th Cir. 1998) (reversing grant of summary judgment for lender
and finding that yield spread premiums are prohibited kickbacks); DuBose v. First
Sec. Sav. Bank, 974 F. Supp. 1426 (N.D. Ala. 1997) (denying lenders' motion for sum-
mary judgment on grounds that yield spread premiums may be illegal referral fees);
Mentecki v. Saxon Mortgage, Inc., No. 96-1629-A, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1197, at *10
(E.D. Va. Jan. 10, 1997) (denying lender's motion to dismiss; borrowers stated a claim
that a yield spread premium violated the anti-kickback provisions of RESPA); Moses
v. Citicorp Mortgage, Inc., 982 F. Supp. 897 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (same); and Martinez v.
Weyerhaeuser Mortgage Corp., 959 F. Supp. 1511 (S.D. Fla. 1996) (denying lenders'
motion for summary judgment on grounds that yield spread premiums may be illegal
referral fees) with Barbosa v. Target Mortgage Corp., 968 F. Supp. 1548 (S.D. Fla.
1997) (a yield spread premium was a lawful payment for services). See also Leonard
A. Bernstein, RESPA Invades Home Equity, Home Improvement and Mobile Home
Financing, 48 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 194, 197 (1994) (questioning legality of yield
spread premiums under RESPA); Robert M. Jaworski, Overages: To Pay or Not to
Pay, That is the Question, 113 BANKING L.J. 909, 911 (1996) (same).
In 1999, the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) issued a policy
statement on the legality of yield spread premiums paid by lenders. 64 Fed. Reg.
10,079 (Mar. 1, 1999). HUD clarified its policy statement in 2001. Statement of Policy
2001-1, 66 Fed. Reg. 53,052 (Oct. 18, 2001). Instead of treating yield spread premiums
as illegal per se, HUD predicates legality on the answer to two questions: (1) were
goods, services or facilities actually provided for the compensation paid?; and (2)
2002] 1579
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even when loan disclosure documents list yield spread premiums,
relatively few borrowers recognize that these premiums will cause
them ultimately to pay higher interest rates.42 Similar problems
are posed by overages, which are incentive payments to loan of-
ficers in the form of negotiable interest and fees over and above
the minimum rates lenders would be willing to accept to close the
loans.43
In the bank context, there are two ways that lenders can induce
prime loan customers to take out subprime loans. First, banks that
offer both subprime and prime loans can steer prime-eligible bor-
rowers to inappropriate subprime products. Second, where banks
make prime loans directly, but segregate subprime lending in non-
bank affiliates or subsidiaries, the subprime entities may refrain
from referring prime-qualified applicants to the banks where they
could obtain prime loans.44 Alternatively, banks may discourage
some prime-eligible applicants from securing prime loans by, for
example, imposing onerous documentation requirements. Ironi-
cally, banks can receive CRA credit for making subprime loans to
LMI borrowers even when the borrowers are eligible for prime
loans.
Steering by non-bank affiliates rarely even appears on the radar
screen of federal bank regulators. The activities of affiliates are
not subject to CRA scrutiny unless parent companies voluntarily
submit to it. Although mortgage lending by non-bank affiliates
(like banks themselves) is subject to the reporting requirements of
the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act ("HMDA"),45 until recently
HMDA's regulations did not require reporting of annual percent-
were the payments reasonably related to the value of those goods, services or facili-
ties? 64 Fed. Reg. at 10,085-86; 66 Fed. Reg. at 53,052-54.
42. See Jackson Testimony, supra note 39, at 2 (asserting that "borrowers are sim-
ply told that their loans will have a certain interest rate, and they never understand
that the interest rate is higher than it needs to be or that the higher interest rate is
used to finance a payment to the mortgage broker").
43. See, e.g., James Brodsky & Rugenia Silver, Nontraditional Home Loans: Com-
pliance Pitfalls, CREDIT UNION EXECUTIVE, Sept. 19, 1996, at 16.
44. In a 2001 report prepared for the Department of the Treasury, Robert E. Litan
and others reported that several banks they interviewed "indicated that 'graduating'
customers to the best credit product for which they qualified was a priority for them,
but that they had not yet worked out the internal procedures to accomplish this goal.
One institution indicated that it did not have such procedures in place and did not
have plans to put them into effect, in part, because of the difficulty of managing across
business lines." ROBERT LITAN ET AL., THE COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT AFTER
FINANCIAL MODERNIZATION: A FINAL REPORT 20 (2001).
45. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2810 (2001). See also BANKING LAW MANUAL, supra note 7,
§ 8.03[2][a].
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age rate ("APR") data, which made it difficult to identify subprime
loans, let alone steering.46
CRA examiners do consider steering when there are allegations
that lenders have discriminated by charging higher rates to minori-
ties or other protected groups. 7 Such discrimination claims are
relatively rare, and are difficult and costly to prove.48
Due to heavy press coverage and in-depth studies by the agen-
cies themselves,49 federal banking regulators are cognizant that
steering is a problem. Since December 2000 or so, the Federal Re-
serve has expected applicants for approval of deposit facilities to
represent that they will review their subprime loan applications for
prime-eligible applicants and offer those customers prime
products.50
46. In February 2002, the Federal Reserve amended HMDA's regulations to re-
quire reporting of the interest rate spreads between APRs and yields on comparable
Treasury securities for certain originated mortgages that are subject to Regulation Z,
12 C.F.R. pt. 226. Lenders must report spreads for first mortgages with APRs of at
least three percent over comparable Treasury securities and for junior mortgages with
like spreads of at least five percent. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem, Home Mortgage Disclosure, 67 Fed. Reg. 7,222, 7,228, 7,237 (Feb. 15, 2002) (to
be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 203.4(a)(12)). Simultaneously, the Fed elicited public com-
ment on whether the three- and five-percent reporting triggers should be changed.
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Home Mortgage Disclosure, 67
Fed. Reg. 7,252 (Feb. 15, 2002).
47. The U.S. Department of Justice brought fair lending actions against Fleet
Mortgage Corp. and Huntington Mortgage Corp. for allegedly charging higher rates
or fees to minorities than similarly situated nonminorities. DOJ also sued or inter-
vened in suits against Delta Funding Corp.; Long Beach Mortgage Company; Capitol
City Mortgage Corp.; First National Bank of Vicksburg, Mississippi; the Security State
Bank of Pecos, Texas; Blackpipe State Bank; Nissan Motor Acceptance Corporation;
General Motors Acceptance Corporation; and the First National Bank of Gordon,
Nebraska on similar charges. In some of those cases loan officers had discretion to
charge "overages," which are interest and points in addition to the minimum price the
lender was willing to accept. DOJ alleged that the loan officers disproportionately
charged overages to minority borrowers in comparison to white borrowers with com-
parable levels of risk. See, e.g., Jo Ann S. Barefoot, What's a fair price?, ABA BANK-
ING J., June 1, 1995, at 28; Steve Cocheo, Will Predatory Lending Shift Fair-Lending
Enforcement?, ABA BANKING J., July 2000, at 8; Christina M. Gattuso, Fair Lending:
Compliance After Chevy Chase, 10 REV. OF BANKING & FIN. SERVS. 141 (1994); Brian
Collins,... so does DOJ, ORIGINATION NEWS, Apr. 2000, at 1; Maynard M. Gordon,
Law Suits Focus on Loan Markups, WARD'S DEALER Bus., Dec. 1, 2000, at 50; Bias in
the Auto Showroom, CHICAGO TRIB., Nov. 4, 2000, at 24; Brodsky & Silver, supra
note 43, at 16; U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Housing and Civil
Enforcement Section, Cases, available at www.usdoj.gov/crt/housing/case-
list.htm#lending (last viewed Mar. 28, 2002).
48. See, e.g., Engel & McCoy, supra note 5.
49. See, e.g., HUD-TREASURY REPORT, supra note 23.
50. See The Chase Manhattan Bank, New York, N.Y., 87 Fed. Res. Bull. 626 (Sept.
2001) (Chase agreed that it would "review subprime mortgage applications and in-
form applicants who might qualify for a prime loan or other available mortgage prod-
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CRA examinations, however, are a different matter. In contrast
to the Fed's new approach to deposit facility applications, federal
banking regulators have not provided guidance to CRA examiners
on how to curb steering. In two advance notices of proposed
rulemaking, one by the Office of Thrift Supervision in April 2000
and the other by federal banking agencies jointly in July 2001, the
agencies solicited public comment on how best to respond to this
problem.5
D. The Paucity of Legitimate Subprime Lending by Banks
Although CRA-covered lenders originate the greatest number of
loans in LMI neighborhoods and to LMI borrowers, these lenders
focus primarily on prime lending. As a result, LMI borrowers with
impaired credit often turn to non-bank lenders-some of whom
are predatory lenders-for subprime loans. Between 1993 and
1998, there was a tremendous surge in lending to LMI borrowers.
CRA-covered institutions accounted for eighty-three percent of
the growth in prime loans to these borrowers.5 2 In contrast, CRA-
covered institutions were responsible for only fifteen percent of the
increase in subprime loans during the same period.53 Subprime
lenders not covered by CRA accounted for two-thirds of the in-
crease in subprime mortgages.54 The failure of CRA-covered insti-
tutions to meet the demand for subprime loans in LMI
neighborhoods runs counter to CRA's goal for banks to "serve the
credit needs of their entire communities.1 55
As community institutions with valuable reputations to maintain,
banks may be disinclined to lend to customers with impaired credit
ucts."); Countrywide Credit Indus., Inc., Calabasas, Cal., 87 Fed. Res. Bull. 419 (June
2001) (Countrywide "provided information about steps taken by [its subprime] sub-
sidiaries to ensure that individuals who qualify for conventional loans are informed
about prime credit products."); Fifth Third Bancorp, Cincinnati, Ohio, 87 Fed. Res.
Bull. 330 (May 2001) ("Old Kent has implemented a procedure for referring borrow-
ers that appear to qualify for traditional 'prime' home mortgage loans to [the] prime
lending division."); The Chase Manhattan Corp., New York, N.Y.; J.P. Morgan & Co.,
Inc., N.Y., New York, 87 Fed, Res. Bull. 76 (Feb. 2001) ("Chase reviews subprime
mortgage applications to inform applicants if they may qualify for a prime loan.");
Wells Fargo & Co. San Francisco, Cal., 86 Fed. Res. Bull. 832 (Dec. 2000).
51. See Community Reinvestment Act Regulations, 66 Fed. Reg. 37,602 (July 19,
2001) (joint advance notice of proposed rulemaking) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt.
563e); Responsible Alternative Mortgage Lending, 65 Fed. Reg. 17,811 (Apr. 5, 2000)
(to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 560).
52. Baseline Report, supra note 3, at 70-72 & chart 14.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 71-72.
55. Id. at 13.
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because they risk criticism if they increase their rejection rates,
charge higher interest rates, or have to foreclose on people's
homes. Similarly, banks may be concerned that CRA and bank
examiners will look askance if they engage in higher risk lending.56
Because banks do not know how CRA and fair lending examin-
ers57 will treat even legitimate subprime lending, they may fear that
if they begin making subprime loans to borrowers with elevated
levels of default risk, examiners will lower their CRA ratings on
grounds of prohibited discrimination. Likewise, banks may be leery
of lending to higher risk customers because of the possibility that
examiners could raise safety and soundness concerns.
The absence of legitimate bank lending in LMI neighborhoods
creates significant market opportunities for predatory lenders.
These lenders can capitalize on unmet demand among higher risk
borrowers and lack of competition from banks. Thus, the reluc-
tance of banks to make subprime loans not only conflicts with the
goals of CRA, but also enables predatory lenders to flourish.
E. Bank Marketing Efforts Fail to Reach Potential Victims of
Predatory Lending
Competition in markets where predatory lenders have taken
hold differs from competition in conventional markets for home
mortgage loans. Typically, prime borrowers approach a number of
56. For a fuller discussion of the disincentives to banks of engaging in subprime
lending, see Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, Changes in the Financial Ser-
vices Market, Predatory Lending, and the Community Reinvestment Act, in FINANCIAL
MODERNIZATION AFTER GRAMM-LEACH-BLILEY 273 (Patricia A. McCoy ed., 2002)
(forthcoming) [hereinafter FINANCIAL MODERNIZATION]; see also Engel & McCoy,
supra note 5.
57. Federal regulators have recognized that offering an array of loan products
based on borrowers' risk, when properly used, can benefit both lenders and borrow-
ers. See, e.g., Alan Greenspan, The Challenge of Central Banking in a Democratic
Society, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Nov. 30, 1994. Just the same, neither CRA's implement-
ing regulations nor the annual interagency question-and-answer guidances on CRA
compliance have addressed the issue of subprime lending. See 12 C.F.R. pts. 25, 228,
345, 563e; Interagency Questions, supra note 27, at 36,620; Interagency Questions and
Answers Regarding Community Reinvestment, 65 Fed. Reg. 25,088 (Apr. 28, 2000);
Interagency Questions and Answers Regarding Community Reinvestment, 64 Fed.
Reg. 23,618 (May 3, 1999); Interagency Questions and Answers Regarding Commu-
nity Reinvestment, 62 Fed. Reg. 52,105 (Oct. 7, 1997); Interagency Questions and
Answers Regarding Community Reinvestment, 61 Fed. Reg. 54,647 (Oct. 21, 1996).
In informal discussions with CRA examiners and CRA officers of banks in different
regions around the country, most individuals with whom we talked confirmed that
subprime lending usually is not a topic in CRA examinations. The sole exception was
a bank holding company that reported inquiries into subprime lending due to preda-
tory lending claims against one of its non-bank subprime subsidiaries.
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different lenders and negotiate the best terms for their loans. As a
result of this "shopping," prime lenders usually offer prime bor-
rowers the equilibrium prime market rate. This is not the case,
however, in communities where predatory lenders reign. Competi-
tion in these communities hinges on which lenders can most
quickly identify potential borrowers and entice them to commit to
loans before other lenders approach them. As a result, the rates
that these borrowers pay are not equilibrium market rates. Rather,
they pay the highest rates their brokers or lenders can extract. In
some cases, this means that prime-eligible borrowers take on loans
that are subprime or predatory. In other situations, people who
are higher risk and therefore ineligible for prime rates enter into
predatory loans.58
The obvious question is why borrowers ever enter into predatory
loans. Borrowers who fall prey to predatory lenders tend to have
been excluded from the home mortgage market due to discrimina-
tion, historical restraints on credit, and lack of sophistication rela-
tive to their more affluent counterparts.59 In addition, they tend to
feel intimidated by banks and loan officers, especially if it means
going to a bank's large, downtown office. These borrowers often
have immediate needs for loans, but are not aware that they are
eligible for credit. Similarly, they do not know how to shop for
credit, and when presented with an opportunity to borrow money,
believe the opportunity is fleeting. When predatory lenders ap-
proach them, they are quick to commit even though they have not
done comparison-shopping and do not understand their loan
terms.60
It is easy for predatory lenders to select their targets. They lo-
cate communities, often communities of color,61 where there has
been no or minimal lending activity.6" Within those communities,
they identify people who have substantial equity in their homes
and who may be in need of loans. For example, lenders use pub-
licly available information to learn of borrowers whose homes are
in disrepair, or who owe back taxes or have been cited for housing
code violations. Armed with this information, the predatory lend-
58. See Engel & McCoy, supra note 5, Section III.C.
59. HUD-TREASURY REPORT, supra note 23, at 18.
60. See id.
61. Census data assists them in identifying minority and LMI census tracts.
62. Predatory lenders can use data collected under the Home Mortgage Disclo-
sure Act to find neighborhoods where prime lenders are not active. See HUD TREA-
SURY REPORT, supra note 23, at 47 (describing concentration of subprime lending in
LMI and minority neighborhoods).
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ers approach the borrowers and persuade them to commit, using
charm and the explicit threat that their offers could vanish in a
flash.63
In contrast to predatory lenders, banks do not employ personal
marketing pitches. Instead, they use mass media to solicit custom-
ers. Mass marketing has only limited success because it fails to at-
tract borrowers who believe that they are ineligible for loans from
banks and who are reluctant to interact with banks.
CRA does not have explicit requirements regarding the market-
ing of bank products. Under the service test, however, the effec-
tiveness of the methods that banks employ to solicit customers
could arguably be a factor in CRA evaluations.64
F. Predatory Lending by Non-bank Subsidiaries and Affiliates
of Banks and Independent Lenders
Although there is evidence that some banks engage in subprime
lending, most banks are not subprime lenders.65 Rather, an over-
whelming proportion of subprime lenders are non-bank mortgage
lenders or finance companies. 66 Some of those lenders are inde-
pendent companies; 67 others are non-bank affiliates or subsidiaries
of insured banks.68 Of the ten largest subprime lenders in 2000,
eight were non-bank entities owned by bank holding companies.69
63. See Engel & McCoy, supra note 5, Section III.C.
64. CRA ANPR, supra note 30, at 37,605 (discussing a proposal that the service
test consider the extent that services offered as part of CRA programs are actually
used by low- and moderate-income persons).
65. Normally, bank holding companies with subprime lenders reap the benefits of
their subprime operations while safeguarding the reputations of their banks by con-
ducting their subprime operations under entirely different names than the names of
their banks. At least one commentator has expressed concern that bank holding com-
panies that bifurcate their consumer lending, with prime lending within the bank and
subprime lending in a non-bank affiliate, may be seeking to dampen competition in
the subprime market through market segmentation. See Cassandra Jones Havard,
Credit Democracy: What's Sub-Prime Lending Got To Do With It?, in FINANCIAL
MODERNIZATION, supra note 56, at 251.
66. Cf. LITAN ET AL., supra note 44, at 32 ("As with home purchase loans, CRA
lenders and affiliates are much less likely than non-CRA lenders to specialize in sub-
prime and manufactured home refinance lending to LMI borrower[s] or area[s].").
67. Given that CRA in its current form does not cover independent lenders, we
defer discussion of independent lenders to Section III, infra, where we address the
advisability of extending CRA to those entities.
68. See HUD TREASURY REPORT, supra note 23, at 43 (describing the entrants
into the subprime lending market).
69. See Robert Julavits, Subprime Risks Extending Beyond Borrowers, AM.
BANKER, Mar. 27, 2000, at 9 (naming Bank of America Corp., First Union Corp.,
Wells Fargo & Co., and Citigroup, Inc.); see also David Russell, Citigroup, Bank of
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Among the various types of subprime lenders, some limit their
lending to subprime loans and others make subprime and preda-
tory loans.
1. The Existence of a Federal Subsidy
The lending activities of non-bank subsidiaries and affiliates of
banks are relevant to our inquiry because the federal safety net
that protects banks may facilitate predatory lending by banks' sub-
sidiaries and affiliates. This federal safety net includes government
charters that confer quasi-oligopolistic power, deposit insurance
benefits, and frequent protection of uninsured depositors and other
creditors through the federal government's bank resolution tech-
niques. It also includes access to the discount window and the Fed-
eral Reserve's payments system (including Fed guarantees of
interbank payments made on Fedwire).7 °
The subsidy concern is as follows: federal deposit insurance and
associated benefits may subsidize banks because banks pay less to
attract depositors' funds than they would if they had to pay a risk
premium. In turn, depositors are willing to accept low interest
rates on their bank deposits because the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation ("FDIC") guarantees return of principal and interest
up to $100,000 per depositor per bank.7' As a result, bank holding
companies and their non-bank subsidiaries may have incentives to
tap into these inexpensive funds by pressing their sister banks for
affiliate loans on below-market terms.72 Presumably, the proceeds
of these loans could be used to finance affiliates' predatory lending
activities.
The very existence of a positive net federal subsidy after taking
into account the regulatory costs borne by banks remains a topic of
America Hold Subprime Loans, WSJ Reports, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Aug. 9, 2001 (rec-
ognizing that "[n]ow 10 of the 25 biggest subprime lenders are parts of banks.").
70. See, e.g., Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., How Should We Respond To The Growing
Risks Of Financial Conglomerates?, in FINANCIAL MODERNIZATION, supra note 56, at
n.42. See also BANKING LAW MANUAL, supra note 7, §§ 15.05, 15.06 (discussing failed
bank resolution methods generally).
71. On the mechanics of federal deposit insurance, see BANKING LAW MANUAL,
supra note 7, § 11.06[2].
72. Such loans are subject to legal limits. Aggregate loans to and other "covered
transactions" with an individual non-bank affiliate by a sister bank may not exceed
ten percent of the bank's capital stock and surplus. A bank's total covered transac-
tions with all of its affiliates may not exceed twenty percent of its capital stock and
surplus. 12 U.S.C. § 371c(a)(1), (b)(7) (2001). All such loans must be fully collateral-
ized with readily marketable collateral, 12 U.S.C. § 371c (c)(1)-(c)(2) (2001), and
made on market terms, 12 U.S.C. § 371c-1(a)(1)(A)-(a)(1)(B) (2001). For large
banks, the legal limits are correspondingly large.
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sharp debate. Although banks receive a gross subsidy, they also
have high regulatory compliance costs, including examination and
reporting requirements, reserve requirements, and risk-adjusted
deposit insurance premiums (although risk-adjusted premiums
have been essentially toothless in recent years because most banks
pay zero premiums).73 In view of these costs, some studies have
concluded that the net subsidy is zero or even slightly negative for
most banks, at least in favorable economic times. Additional stud-
ies have indicated that the net deposit insurance subsidy is more
likely to become positive during times of financial stress. 4
Notwithstanding this debate, banks and bank holding companies
behave in ways that suggest a positive net subsidy. It is striking
that virtually no bank holding company has ever "debanked" by
surrendering all of its bank and thrift charters or divesting itself of
its depository institutions.7 Similarly, in the savings and loan crisis
of the 1980s and early 1990s, non-bank affiliates took advantage of
the federal subsidy when borrowing from their sister banks. In that
crisis, poorly underwritten loans by banks to their sister non-bank
73. See, e.g., Bernard Shull & Lawrence J. White, The Right Corporate Structure
for Expanded Bank Activities, 115 BANKING L.J. 446, 466 (1998). In the Deposit In-
surance Funds Act of 1996, Congress repealed the previous $2000 annual minimum
assessment for deposit insurance. Deposit Insurance Funds Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-208, § 2708, 110 Stat. 3009-497 (1996). In addition, FDIC generally may not
charge premiums in excess of the amount needed to maintain full capitalization (oth-
erwise known as the "designated reserve ratio"). 12 U.S.C. § 1817(b)(2)(A)(iii)
(2001). Currently, both deposit insurance funds are fully capitalized. Hence, the
strongest institutions (comprising well over ninety percent of both banks and thrifts)
currently pay premiums of zero. See generally BANKING LAW MANUAL, supra note 7,
§ 11.06[4].
74. For competing views in this debate, see, for example, Allen N. Berger, Richard
J. Herring & Giorgio P. Szego, The Role Of Capital In Financial Institutions, 19 J.
BANKING & FIN. 393, 400-06 (1995); Kenneth Jones & Barry Kolatch, The Federal
Safety Net, Banking Subsidies, and Implications for Financial Modernization, 12 FDIC
BANKING REV. 1, 2-12 (1999); Myron L. Kwast & S. Wayne Passmore, The Subsidy
Provided by the Federal Safety Net: Theory and Evidence, 16 J. FIN. SERV. RES. 35
passim (1999); Bevis Longstreth & Ivan E. Mattei, Organizational Freedom for
Banks: The Case in Support, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1895, 1918 (1997); Alfred Pollard,
Exploding the Subsidy Myth, 72 BANKING REP. (BNA) 83 (1999); John R. Walter, Can
a Safety Net Be Contained?, 84 FED. RES. BANK RICHMOND ECON. Q., Winter 1998, at
1, 2-11; Frederick Furlong, Federal Subsidies in Banking: The Link to Financial Mod-
ernization, FRBSF ECON. LETTER No. 97-31 (Federal Res. Bank of San Francisco,
Oct. 24, 1997).
75. See, e.g., Olaf de Senerpont Domis, Debunking Debanking: Idea Sounds Inter-
esting But Examine the Costs, AM. BANKER, Sept. 29, 1997, at 1, 4 (noting that a bank
that surrendered its charter would lose "[t]he ability to quickly and efficiently move
large amounts of money" through the Fed's payments system; would pay "more to
attract funds" due to loss of deposit insurance; and "would risk losing customers look-
ing for safety").
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affiliates played a role in the massive bank and thrift failures of the
era.
76
A second example that suggests a positive net subsidy arises
from the fact that bank holding companies have devised novel
ways of using federal deposit insurance guarantees to attract higher
flows of low-cost funds, which may then be used to fund non-bank
subsidiaries' subprime and/or predatory lending operations. The
prime example is Citigroup's new program, instituted in 2000,
which allows Citigroup's securities customers with uninsured bro-
kerage accounts to "sweep" their funds in those accounts into
FDIC-insured bank accounts at one or more of Citigroup's banks
(now ten in number), thereby obtaining up to one million dollars in
deposit insurance.77 With the added funds that Citigroup is able to
attract through the sweep accounts, some fear that Citigroup will
use the new deposits to fund CitiFinancial/Associates, its non-bank
subprime subsidiary78 that has been accused of past predatory
lending practices.79
To summarize, if non-bank affiliates and subsidiaries benefit
from federal subsidies, we need to consider whether banks should
be penalized for using subsidies to finance predatory lending. Sim-
ilarly, subsidy concerns arise when banks use creative vehicles such
as brokerage sweep accounts to expand deposit insurance coverage
and thereby multiply the low-cost funds available to fund preda-
tory lenders.
2. Current Treatment under CRA
CRA typically does not require scrutiny of the subprime lending
activities of non-bank finance companies. Independent mortgage
companies are exempt from CRA for all purposes. Non-bank sub-
76. See, e.g., Kathleen Day, S&L Hell 24 (1993); Lawrence J. White, The S&L
Debacle: Public Policy Lessons For Bank And Thrift Regulators 45, 115-16 (1991);
Nat'l Comm'n on Fin. Inst. Reform, Recovery and Enforcement, Origins and Causes
of the S&L Debacle: A Blueprint for Reform 37, 46-48 (1993). See generally Banking
Law Manual, supra note 7, § 4.02 & n.14, for a discussion of related holding company
incentives.
77. Rob Blackwell, Solly's Sweeps Show FDIC Fund Worries Still Apply, AM.
BANKER, Oct. 29, 2001, at 1.
78. See Richard Melville, Preferred Issues: Deposit Power: Where Merrill, B of A,
Citi Agree, AM. BANKER, Dec. 18, 2000, at 1. See also Blackwell, supra note 77, at 1
(noting how Citigroup extended its sweeps coverage to ten subsidiary banks); Wil-
marth, supra note 70.
79. See Sandra Fleishman, FTC Sues Lending Unit of Citigroup; Associates Ac-
cused 'Abusive' Acts, WASH. POST, Mar. 7, 2001, at E01.
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prime affiliates of insured banks are also exempt from CRA exami-
nations unless they volunteer for examination.
CRA does demand scrutiny of non-bank subprime affiliates
when banks file applications for deposit facilities. Historically, the
Fed had a "hands-off" policy with respect to protests alleging pred-
atory lending by bank affiliates, sometimes accompanied by the
bromide that "subprime lending is a permissible activity and pro-
vides needed credit to consumers who have difficulty meeting con-
ventional underwriting criteria." 0 If applicants said that they did
not have a role in the lending practices or credit review processes
of the subprime affiliates, the Fed would not pursue allegations of
lending abuses, and, at most, would refer discrimination charges to
the agencies in charge of fair lending enforcement.8 1 Similarly,
charges that a bank financed a subprime lender through loans were
dismissed as not germane so long as the bank represented that it
did not have a role in the lending practices and review processes of
the subprime lender nor any knowledge of the subprime entity's
lending practices.8 2 In one case, the Board refused to extend the
brief public comment period for additional investigation into prices
charged by the subprime lenders in question. 3
In its 2001 review of FleetBoston's merger with Summit
Bancorp., the Fed waved aside abusive lending charges on some-
80. Fifth Third Bancorp, Cincinnati, Ohio, 87 Fed. Res. Bull. 330 (May 2001).
81. See First Union Corp. Charlotte, North Carolina; Wachovia Corp. Winston-
Salem, N.C., 87 Fed. Res. Bull. 683, (Oct. 2001).
82. See Firstar Corp., Milwaukee, Wis.; U.S. Bancorp, Minneapolis, Minn., 87 Fed.
Res. Bull. 236 (Apr. 2001); Order Approving an Application to Become a Bank Hold-
ing Company and Notices to Acquire Nonbanking Companies (Deutsche Bank AG),
85 Fed. Res. Bull. 509 (July 1999). In dismissing similar claims in Mizuho Holdings,
Inc. (In Formation), Tokyo, Japan, 86 Fed. Res. Bull. 776 (Nov. 2000), the Board also
belittled the amount of the financing, noting that the applicant's two subsidiaries had
"only" provided credit facilities to subprime lenders totaling $180 million. Similarly,
with respect to Republic Bank's purchases of mortgage-backed securities issued by
Delta Funding Corporation, which faced highly publicized accusations of predatory
lending, the Board simply said that it had "considered [the fair lending issues raised]
in reviewing the convenience and needs factors in this case," before approving the
application with no further discussion of the allegations. HSBC Holdings plc, London,
United Kingdom, 86 Fed. Res. Bull. 140 (Feb. 2000). Finally, in Countrywide Credit
Indus., Inc., Calabasas, Cal., 87 Fed. Res. Bull. 419 (June 2001), the Fed approved the
application of Countrywide Credit Industries, Inc., to acquire Treasury Bank, Ltd.,
and thereby become a bank holding company with only cursory review of Country-
wide's subprime operations.
83. See Norwest Corp., Minneapolis, Minn.; Wells Fargo & Co., San Francisco,
Cal., 84 Fed. Res. Bull. 1088 (Dec. 1998). This request had special currency given the
Board's decision in 1997 to shorten the period for considering certain kinds of CRA
protests. See 62 Fed. Reg. 9,290 (1997) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 225).
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what different grounds.84 When a commenter suggested that Fleet-
Boston might be engaged in subprime lending that was harmful to
minority borrowers, the Fed remarked that FleetBoston "currently
conducts no lending activities that are subject to Home Ownership
and Equity Protection Act ("HOEPA"), and that controls are in
place to ensure that no HOEPA-covered transactions are initi-
ated. ' 85 What the decision did not say is that nearly ninety-eight
percent of subprime loans escaped HOEPA's coverage at the
time.86
Lately, however, the Fed has obtained greater assurances from
applicants that due diligence procedures and internal controls are
in place against lending abuses. For example, in the 2001 Wacho-
via-First Union merger, First Union provided a detailed description
of its due diligence procedures in financing and underwriting
securitizations of subprime loans.87 With respect to the origination
activities of its own subprime affiliate, First Union stated that it
had established a program to address customer complaints, broker
relationships, and servicing.88 Similarly, in Firstar Corporation's
merger with U.S. Bancorp, U.S. Bancorp furnished the Fed with
information on the lending practices of a subprime lender in which
it owned a minority interest, including information on compliance
procedures, the methodology used in setting interest rates, and the
lender's relationship with loan brokers and correspondents. 89
These two cases pale in comparison, however, with the Fed's
scrutiny of two Citigroup applications in mid-2001, one to acquire
the European American Bank ("EAB") and the other to acquire
Grupo Financiero Banamex Accival, S.A. de C.V. and Banco Na-
84. See FleetBoston Fin. Corp., Boston, Mass., 87 Fed. Res. Bull. 252 (Apr. 2001).
85. Id.
86. Recently, the Fed promulgated a new rule expanding HOEPA's coverage, but
that rule extends HOEPA only to five percent of subprime first mortgages. See Fed-
eral Reserve System, Truth in Lending, Final Rule 8-9 (Dec. 12, 2001).
87. First Union Corp. Charlotte, North Carolina; Wachovia Corp. Winston-Salem,
N.C., 87 Fed. Res. Bull. 683 (Oct. 2001).
88. Id.; see also The Chase Manhattan Corp., New York, N.Y., J.P. Morgan & Co.,
Inc., New York, N.Y., 87 Fed. Res. Bull. 76 (Feb. 2001) (stating that applicants made
representations to the Fed about their due diligence and oversight with respect to
warehouse financing and/or securitization services to subprime lenders); Mizuho
Holdings, Inc. (In Formation), Tokyo, Japan, 86 Fed. Res. Bull. 776 (Nov. 2000)
(somewhat weaker representations).
89. See Firstar Corp., Milwaukee, Wis.; U.S. Bancorp, Minneapolis, Minn., 87 Fed.
Res. Bull. 236 (Apr. 2001). See also Mizuho Holdings, Inc. (In Formation), Tokyo,
Japan, 86 Fed. Res. Bull. 776 (Nov. 2000).
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cional de Mexico, S.A. ("Banamex"). 90 Both applications set off
huge protests due to Citigroup's recent acquisition of the subprime
lender Associates, which had been vilified in the press for alleged
predatory lending.91 In the interim, the Federal Trade Commission
had sued Associates and Citigroup for predatory lending abuses
under the Federal Trade Commission Act.92
In the EAB decision, in contrast with its prior decisions, the Fed
acknowledged that "[b]orrowers do not benefit from expanded ac-
cess to credit if the credit involves abusive lending practices." 93 Al-
though the Fed approved the application, it recited lengthy
representations by Citigroup about the due diligence measures im-
plemented by its securities subsidiary, which had served as under-
writer for subprime securitizations, as well as by its mortgage
warehouse-lending subsidiary.9a Additionally, the Fed described in
exhaustive detail the internal controls and underwriting practices
of Citigroup's various subprime lending units, particularly those of
CitiFinancial (the successor to Associates).95 CitiFinancial's assur-
ances to the Fed included restrictions on prepayment penalties; use
of testers; compliance training; stricter oversight of loan brokers;
prohibitions against refinancing of Habitat for Humanity and other
zero-interest loans; limits on points; and safeguards against loan
flipping (i.e., repeated refinancings in order to charge high fees or
points.)96 After a lengthy recitation of these assurances, the Board
announced that it would conduct "a thorough examination" to ver-
ify implementation and would require Citigroup to submit quar-
terly reports on all major litigation involving subprime lending and
compliance with any resulting court orders or court-approved set-
tlements.9 The Banamex case contained a parallel discussion.98
In the merger context, the Federal Reserve has been a Johnny-
come-lately to the issue of subprime abuses. The type and extent
of due diligence procedures and internal controls that it expects
from applicants have varied widely from case to case. Neverthe-
90. Citigroup Inc., New York, N.Y., 87 Fed. Res. Bull. 600 (Sept. 2001) (EAB);
Citigroup Inc., New York, N.Y., 87 Fed. Res. Bull. 613 (Sept. 2001) (Banamex).
91. Id.
92. See note 79 supra.
93. See Citigroup Inc., New York, N.Y., 87 Fed. Res. Bull. 600 (Sept. 2001) (EAB).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Citigroup Inc., New York, N.Y., 87 Fed. Res. Bull. 613 (Sept. 2001)
(Banamex).
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less, the Federal Reserve's most recent cases show distinct progress
and provide a framework for a more general response under CRA.
III. How SHOULD CRA RESPOND?
A. Sanctioning Banks for their Direct Involvement in
Predatory Lending
Some may argue that banks should receive CRA credit for
originating or brokering predatory loans because they are serving
the credit needs of their communities. The reality is, however, that
when banks make loans that borrowers cannot afford to repay,
banks are not meeting the credit needs of the communities they
serve. Instead, they are contributing to the further marginalization
and decline of the communities and sometimes receiving CRA
credit in the process. Federal bank regulators recognized this irony
in their most recent CRA Advance Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking:
some are concerned that the regulations generally seem to pro-
vide consideration of loans without regard to whether the lend-
ing activities are appropriate. They recommend that a CRA
examination also should include consideration of whether cer-
tain loans contain harmful or abusive terms and, therefore, do
not help meet community credit needs.99
For these reasons, it is important to consider whether CRA
should be employed to deter banks from engaging in predatory
lending.
A threshold question is whether CRA is a workable tool for reg-
ulating the substance of loan terms and practices. CRA and fair
lending examiners already review banks' lending practices and loan
terms to insure that banks comply with discrimination laws.100
There is no reason why CRA examiners could not also review
loans to insure that they are not predatory. From the regulators'
perspective, there would be some additional costs associated with
expanding the scope of CRA exams: examiners might need addi-
tional training and CRA exams would be lengthier. From banks'
perspective, it is unlikely that having examiners review loans for
99. CRA ANPR, supra note 30, at 37,604.
100. Banking regulators will lower banks' CRA ratings where banks have discrimi-
nated against customers on prohibited grounds. See Marion A. Cowell, Jr., & Monty
D. Hagler, The Community Reinvestment Act in the Decade of Bank Consolidation, 27
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 83, 98 (1992) (concluding that it "is absolutely clear that any
institution which has engaged in discrimination in its lending activities simply will not
pass a CRA evaluation.").
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abusive lending would increase their burden. Presumably, the loan
files that banks already provide for examiners would form the bulk
of the materials that examiners would need to spot abusive lending
practices. In sum, the regulatory burden of expanding CRA exams
to identify banks that engage in predatory lending does not appear
onerous.
Given that predatory lending undermines the goals of CRA, and
that the structure of CRA exams could easily incorporate review
for predatory loans, the next question is: what loan terms and prac-
tices constitute predatory lending for CRA exam purposes? This
question is critical because examiners must have a uniform and
clear understanding of the terms and practices that federal regula-
tors deem predatory. We recommend that regulators start by re-
viewing all subprime loans for the prohibited practices outlined in
HOEPA and its regulations, as amended, 101 whether or not those
loans are covered by HOEPA. The regulations include prohibi-
tions against loan flipping, asset-based lending, negative amortiza-
tion, advance payments, and increased interest rates after default,
as well as limitations on balloon payments, prepayment penalties,
and payments to home improvement contractors. °2 We also sug-
gest that regulators add a residual income test to the loan eligibility
criteria.' 0 3 Residual income is the amount of money borrowers
have left after taking into account the cost of living in their com-
munities and the number of people who rely on their income.104
Banks should not make loans to applicants whose residual incomes
are insufficient to meet their mortgage loan obligations and other
necessities such as food and clothing.105
The remaining question is how CRA should treat banks that fail
to comply with the loan eligibility criteria. At a minimum, banks
should not receive positive CRA credit for any lending that vio-
lates the loan eligibility criteria. The more difficult question is
whether CRA should impose demerits. When banks originate and/
or broker predatory loans, they actively engage in predatory lend-
ing that, in some cases, may be financed by federal subsidies. For
101. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1604, 1637(c)(5) (2001); 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.32(d), 226.34 (2002); see
also Truth in Lending, 66 Fed. Reg. 65,604, 65,617 (2001).
102. 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.32(d), 226.34 (2002).
103. This idea has been advanced by Cassandra Jones Havard. See Havard, supra
note 65, at 251.
104. Id.
105. If federal regulators do adopt loan eligibility criteria, they should regularly
review and amend the guidelines to take into account any new methods that preda-
tory lenders develop to exploit innocent borrowers.
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these reasons, it is appropriate to impose a powerful disincentive to
deter predatory lending by banks. We propose that any bank that
fails to satisfy the loan eligibility criteria for its subprime mortgages
be precluded from receiving a CRA rating of satisfactory or out-
standing, whether or not those mortgages are within the bank's
CRA assessment area.
B. Sanctioning Banks for their Indirect Involvement in
Predatory Lending
When banks finance subprime lenders through working capital
loans, letters of credit, or purchases of subprime loans or securities
backed by subprime loans, they may unwittingly or knowingly fi-
nance predatory lending. The same is true when they act as under-
writers of subprime securitizations. Currently, CRA does not
sanction banks when they play these supportive roles. Indeed, the
financing of predatory lending may be eligible for CRA credit.
A HUD-Treasury Report underscored the need for secondary
market purchasers, including banks, to be part of the solution to
predatory lending:
[w]hile the secondary market could be viewed as part of the
problem of abusive practices in the subprime mortgage market,
it may also represent a large part of the solution to that prob-
lem. If the secondary market refuses to purchase loans that
carry abusive terms, or loans originated by lenders engaging in
abusive practices, the primary market might react to the result-
ing loss of liquidity by ceasing to make these loans.1"6
CRA can create incentives for banks to be part of the solution
by downgrading banks' CRA ratings if they finance subprime lend-
ers without insisting on appropriate due diligence or adequate in-
ternal controls." 7 Reducing banks' CRA ratings for financing
106. HUD-TREASURY REPORT, supra note 23, at 108.
107. For example, a bank with an outstanding rating would drop to a satisfactory
rating. Federal banking regulators could set standards by developing, by rule or gui-
dance, loan eligibility criteria that subprime lenders would have to observe before
they could sell their loans to banks (either individually or through securitization).
The Federal Reserve Board's decision in Citigroup Inc., New York, N.Y., 87 Fed. Res.
Bull. 600 (Sept. 2001) (EAB), contains a lengthy list of eligibility criteria for loans
originated by Citigroup's subprime affiliate, CitiFinancial. Those criteria, among
other things, include bans on balloon payments, single premium credit insurance, and
negative amortization features; a "referral up" program for prime-eligible borrowers;
limits on and waivers of prepayment penalties; institution of testers; caps on points;
safeguards against loan flipping; and bans on refinancing of subsidized mortgages
within a stated timeframe. Id. at 606-08. In addition, Citigroup agreed to implement a
program to provide rate reductions to subprime loan borrowers who make timely
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subprime lenders without screening for possible predatory lending
is one way of providing needed incentives for secondary market
monitoring by banks. Similarly, banks that serve as lead managing
underwriters on subprime loan securitizations should receive CRA
downgrades if they fail to institute due diligence or other
safeguards.' 0 8
payments and a graduation program to refer subprime borrowers with good payment
records to Citigroup's prime lender for a prime loan. Id. at 608. For purchased or
existing subprime loans held in portfolio, Citigroup committed to give borrowers with
balloon payments coming due the option to refinance their loans in lieu of making the
balloon payments. Id. at n.48.
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have each adopted more limited eligibility criteria de-
signed to disqualify mortgages with certain predatory features from purchase. For
example, Fannie Mae will not buy loans where the points and fees exceed five percent
of the loan principal. In addition, Fannie Mae restricts prepayment penalties in loans
that it purchases. HUD Housing Goal Rules, supra note 37, at 65,068. Similarly,
Fannie Mae will not buy loans from lenders who steer prime-eligible borrowers to
higher cost products. Id. Neither Fannie Mae nor Freddie Mac buy mortgages carry-
ing single premium credit life insurance coverage or high cost mortgages covered by
the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act ("HOEPA"). Id.
In 2000, the Department of Housing and Urban Development concluded that these
measures by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac "lack[ed] important details" and might
"not be sufficient" to thwart unwitting purchases of predatory loans. Id. at 65,068.
Consequently, HUD promulgated a final rule stipulating that Fannie Mae and Fred-
die Mac would not receive credit toward HUD's affordable housing goals for
purchases of high cost loans, including mortgages, containing one or more of an ex-
panded set of "unacceptable" features and practices. Id. at 65,069. Those unaccept-
able features and practices include:
1. mortgages that fall within the HOEPA triggers (see Engel & McCoy,
supra note 5, Section IV.D.);
2. loans where the total points and fees charged to a borrower exceed five
percent of the loan amount (except for small loans or where the five percent
cap would make origination unprofitable);
3. prepayment penalties (except where (i) the mortgage provides a rate or
fee reduction in exchange for the prepayment penalty; (ii) the borrower is
offered a choice of a mortgage that does not contain such a penalty; (iii) the
terms of the prepayment penalty are adequately disclosed; and (iv) default
does not trigger the prepayment penalty);
4. single premium credit life insurance products;
5. asset-based loans in which the lender did not adequately consider the
borrower's ability to repay based upon comparison of his or her income,
assets and liabilities to the mortgage payments;
6. declining to report complete borrower information to credit agencies;
7. steering of prime-eligible customers to higher cost products; and
8. failing to comply with fair lending requirements (for example, by dis-
criminating on the basis of prohibited factors such as race, gender or age).
Id. at 65,070-71.
108. Banks can serve in other, subsidiary capacities in securitizations, including as
registrars, custodians, and paying agents for securitizations of subprime loans. Simi-
larly, banks have served as bond indenture trustees for subprime lenders. Banks that
serve in such roles are not in an optimal position to monitor and therefore we would
not impose due diligence duties on them.
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Efforts to monitor subprime loan originators are in their infancy.
Nevertheless, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and a number of major
banks have adopted rudimentary due diligence procedures when
financing subprime lenders. 1 9 As the secondary market gains
more experience monitoring, these tools can be refined. In the
meantime, we recommend that the following safeguards apply to
all bank purchases of subprime loans, bank loans to subprime lend-
ers, bank loan guarantees to subprime lenders, and bank under-
writings of subprime securitizations:
Due Diligence
1. Before the closing, the bank"' must review the lender's un-
derwriting guidelines, loan processing procedures, loan agree-
ment forms, and compliance programs for two purposes:
compliance with consumer lending laws and regulations and
compliance with the loan eligibility criteria we discussed
supra.'1
1
2. Before closing, the bank should perform on-site sampling of
the lender's loans to verify that the lender is complying with the
loan eligibility criteria, including the residual income test, and
consumer lending laws. Similarly, review should be done with
an eye toward red flags suggesting lender or broker fraud, such
as unsigned application forms or evidence that borrowers' prop-
erty was conveyed to the lender."12
109. See, e.g., First Union Corp. Charlotte, N.C.; Wachovia Corp. Winston-Salem,
N.C., 87 Fed. Res. Bull. 683, 697 (Oct. 2001) (describing a program that "features
reviews of underwriting criteria, second analyses of rejected applications, regression
modeling of portfolios, and ongoing training"); Citigroup Inc., New York, N.Y., 87
Fed. Res. Bull. 600 (Sept. 2001) (EAB); Citigroup Inc., New York, N.Y., 87 Fed. Res.
Bull. 613 (Sept. 2001) (Banamex); The Chase Manhattan Corporation, New York,
N.Y.; J.P. Morgan & Co., Inc., New York, N.Y., 87 Fed. Res. Bull. 76 (Feb. 2001)
(describing due diligence actions including on-site review and review of loan docu-
ments on any subprime loan purchased); Mizuho Holdings, Inc. (In Formation), To-
kyo, Japan, 86 Fed. Res. Bull. 776, 778 (Nov. 2000) (finding no violation of fair
lending laws after forwarding loan information to the bank and consulting with HUD,
the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission).
110. Where banks purchase mortgage-backed securities, the lead managing under-
writers of the securitizations could discharge this duty. Bank purchasers of such se-
curities should ascertain that the lead underwriters adopt the due diligence and
monitoring procedures, and contract terms discussed herein. Cf. Office of Thrift Su-
pervision, Responsible Alternative Mortgage Lending, 65 Fed. Reg. 17,811 (Apr. 5,
2000) ("The institution could, for example, make inquiries to the securitizers concern-
ing their efforts to minimize the inclusion of predatory loans in their securitized
pools.").
111. See supra notes 101-105 and accompanying text.
112. See, e.g., First Union Corp. Charlotte, N.C.; Wachovia Corp. Winston-Salem,
N.C., 87 Fed. Res. Bull. 683 (Oct. 2001); Citigroup Inc., New York, N.Y., 87 Fed. Res.
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3. Before closing, the bank should obtain written representa-
tions and warranties from the subprime lender ensuring that it
complies with, and will continue to comply with, all applicable
laws, including consumer protection laws. In addition, each sub-
prime lender should furnish written representations and warran-
ties ensuring that it satisfies the loan eligibility criteria and will
continue to do so. 113
4. Before closing, the bank should review copies of all com-
plaints regarding the originator's lending practices in agency and
court proceedings over the past five years and ascertain the out-
come of those complaints. It should also inquire into any agency
investigations or proceedings or criminal prosecutions concern-
ing alleged discrimination or lending abuses over the same time
period. The subprime lender should also furnish written repre-
sentations and warranties that it is in full compliance with any
court orders, agency directives, consent decrees and/or settle-
ment terms regarding its lending terms and/or practices.
Contract Terms
1. In the contract, the subprime lender must agree to maintain
loan documentation that is sufficient to verify compliance with
loan eligibility criteria and consumer lending laws and
regulations.
2. For securitizations or loan purchases, the contract should
contain a recourse provision requiring the subprime lender to
take back all loans that become delinquent or go into default.
The recourse provisions should go into effect if the bank, in its
sole discretion, determines that the lender fails to comply with
the loan eligibility criteria or consumer lending laws, or that the
lender's documentation is so inadequate that the bank cannot
adequately monitor the lender's practices.
3. The contract should require the subprime lender to provide
regular reports to the bank on the status of pending or recently
Bull. 600 (Sept. 2001) (EAB); Citigroup Inc., New York, N.Y., 87 Fed. Res. Bull. 613
(Sept. 2001) (Banamex); The Chase Manhattan Corporation, New York, N.Y.; J.P.
Morgan & Co., Inc., New York, N.Y., 87 Fed. Res. Bull. 76 (Feb. 2001); Mizuho Hold-
ings, Inc. (In Formation), Tokyo, Japan, 86 Fed. Res. Bull. 776 (Nov. 2000). See also
Office of Thrift Supervision, Responsible Alternative Mortgage Lending, 65 Fed. Reg.
17,811 (Apr. 5, 2000) ("[A]n institution might sample loan files to ensure that the
originating lender has appropriately priced the product, looking for evidence of exces-
sive fees.").
113. See, e.g., Citigroup Inc., New York, N.Y., 87 Fed. Res. Bull. 600 (Sept. 2001)
(EAB); Citigroup Inc., New York, N.Y., 87 Fed. Res. Bull. 613 (Sept. 2001)
(Banamex); The Chase Manhattan Corp., New York, N.Y.; J.P. Morgan & Co., Inc.,
New York, N.Y., 87 Fed. Res. Bull. 76 (Feb. 2001).
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resolved litigation, prosecution or other formal complaints alleg-
ing abusive lending practices or lending discrimination.1 1
4
4. The contract should require the subprime lender to provide
credit reporting agencies.with monthly full-file credit reports on
borrowers for every loan purchased. 15
Monitoring Post-Closing"6
1. Following closing, the bank should do periodic random spot
checks of the subprime lender to ensure compliance with the
representations and warranties.
2. Following closing, the bank should conduct special audits of
the lender's subprime terms and practices whenever red flags
appear indicating possible predatory lending (such as press re-
ports of new investigations or lawsuits, a surprisingly high delin-
quency or default rate on purchased loans, or complaints by
borrowers or their counsel).
C. Deterring Steering of Prime Borrowers to Subprime
and PredatoryLoans
To the extent that banks or their non-bank subsidiaries and affili-
ates are steering prime eligible borrowers to subprime loans, they
are running afoul of the principles that motivated CRA. This is
even more egregious if banks receive CRA credit for these loans.
One antidote would be to include an anti-steering provision in
the loan eligibility criteria discussed earlier.'17 Under such an anti-
steering provision, banks that originate or broker subprime loans
would have to determine whether subprime applicants qualify for
prime loans under the same underwriting criteria that they use for
prime applicants. Alternatively, the provision could require that
banks use Fannie Mae's Desktop Underwriting or Freddie Mac's
Loan Prospector to determine whether subprime borrowers are eli-
gible for prime loans. 18 Violations of the anti-steering provision
114. Cf Citigroup Inc., New York, N.Y., 87 Fed. Res. Bull. 600 (Sept. 2001) (EAB)
(requiring Citigroup to submit quarterly reports for two years to the Federal Reserve
Board on the status of all major litigation involving any of its subprime affiliates and
compliance with any resulting court orders or court-approved settlements).
115. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac require monthly full-file credit reports of all
subprime lenders from whom they purchase loans. See HUD HOUSING GOAL RULES,
supra note 37, at 65,068.
116. Monitoring requirements should only apply if banks are engaged in ongoing or
repeated purchases, loans, guarantees or underwritings.
117. See supra notes 101-105 and accompanying text.
118. See, e.g., Fannie Mae, Announcement 00-03, Attachment 1, available at
www.efanniemae.com (last visited Feb. 21, 2002); FREDDIE MAC, AUTOMATED UN-
DERWRITING, supra note 37, ch. 4. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac also do some manual
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would have the same consequence as failing to abide by the loan
eligibility criteria. Similarly, banks should insist on anti-steering
provisions when underwriting or purchasing subprime loans, or se-
curities backed by subprime loans. They should insist on the same
provisions when extending loans or issuing letters of credit to sub-
prime lenders.1 19
D. Encouraging Legitimate Subprime Lending by Banks
The paucity of legitimate subprime lending to LMI borrowers by
banks suggests that CRA incentives to make subprime loans do not
overcome the disincentives to banks of engaging in such lending. 120
The inaction by banks has, in turn, enabled predatory lending to
take hold in LMI neighborhoods. One way to correct this problem
would be to award additional CRA credit to banks that directly or
indirectly support legitimate subprime lending. 12' We recommend
that under the lending or the investment test, banks receive credit
for brokering or originating legitimate subprime loans, or financing
legitimate subprime lending through one of the mechanisms we
have discussed.
We also recommend awarding additional CRA credit to banks
that refinance predatory loans with legitimate subprime loans.122
Refinancing predatory loans can be problematic for banks because
the loan-to-value ("LTV") ratios often exceed one hundred per-
underwriting based on FICO scores. See, e.g., Kim R. Anderson, GSEs See Automa-
tion As Spurring Low-Mod Housing, NAT'L MORTGAGE NEWS, June 12, 2000, at 22;
Brian Angell, A Score to Settle; Consumer Demand Is High For Credit Scores. What Is
The Holdup?, U.S. BANKER, Aug. 2000, at 34.
119. Fannie Mae will not buy loans from lenders who steer prime-eligible borrow-
ers to higher cost products. See HUD Housing Goal Rules, supra note 37, at 65,068.
120. See supra text accompanying note 56.
121. By legitimate, we mean in compliance with our proposed loan eligibility crite-
ria and anti-steering provisions.
New York lenders, with assistance from Fannie Mae, community groups, and legal
services attorneys, have refinanced one million dollars of predatory loans. Comment
of Fannie Mae regarding the joint advance notice of proposed rulemaking; Commu-
nity Reinvestment Act (CRA) Regulations, Oct. 17, 2001, available at
www.ots.treas.gov/docs/95312.pdf (last visited Feb. 21, 2002).
122. See, e.g., Neighborhood Housing Services of Chicago, Rebuilding Chicago's
Neighborhoods 11 (2001), available at www.nhschicago.org/news/pdf/annual00.pdf
(last visited Mar. 26, 2002) (describing the NORMAL program in Chicago that assists
borrowers refinance predatory loans with more affordable fixed-rate loans). In cases
where the lenders engaged in steering or where borrowers improved their credit, it
might even be appropriate for banks to refinance predatory loans with prime loans.
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cent.123 Furthermore, victims of predatory loans often have poor
credit histories, sometimes solely due to the predatory loans.
Banks will be reluctant to refinance loans to borrowers with poor
credit histories or who do not have sufficient equity in their
property.
Nevertheless, the impediments to refinancing predatory loans
are not insurmountable. Predatory lenders often violate disclosure
requirements or engage in fraud. As a result, they may be amena-
ble to reducing the outstanding balance of borrowers' loans in re-
sponse to legal action. In turn, that would reduce the borrowers'
LTV and increase the equity in their property. Banks could em-
ploy their legal departments or work with legal services attorneys
or pro bono outside counsel to put pressure on predatory lenders
to reduce borrowers' principal. Similarly, in deciding whether to
refinance predatory loans, banks could rely on the borrowers'
credit histories prior to their obtaining predatory loans. The prior
credit history would help banks distinguish borrowers whose blem-
ished credit histories reflect long-term credit problems from those
with credit problems due to predatory loans. Banks could accord-
ingly limit their refinancing to the latter group.
In sum, in light of the lack of legitimate subprime lending in LMI
neighborhoods, the prevalence of predatory lending in these neigh-
borhoods, and the disincentives to banks of offering legitimate sub-
prime loans, we recommend that banks that engage in legitimate
subprime lending, especially those that restructure predatory loans,
receive additional CRA credit.
E. Rewarding Banks that Develop Programs that Reach
Potential Victims of Predatory Lending
CRA incentives to increase legitimate subprime lending in LMI
communities and thereby stimulate competition will be ineffective
unless banks reach LMI borrowers. Banks' failure in this regard is
part and parcel of their failure to serve their communities. For this
reason, banks should receive CRA credits under the service test 124
for adopting practices that effectively reach LMI customers. 25
123. See, e.g., Consumers Union, The Hard Sell: Combating Home Equity Lending
Fraud in California, Part II, available at www.consumersunion.org/finance/
hspart2wc989.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2002).
124. Woodstock Institute, Comments on 2002 ANPR on CRA, October 4, 2000,
available at www.ots.treas.gov/docs/95136.pdf (last visited Feb. 21, 2002).
125. For a discussion of ways that banks can attract LMI customers and customers
of color, see John P. Caskey, Bringing Unbanked Households into the Banking Sys-
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The easiest, although arguably least effective, method1 2 6 to ad-
dress predatory lending is through consumer education programs
that inform consumers of the risks of predatory lending and iden-
tify alternative sources of loans.127 The success of education pro-
grams hinges on whether the information makes its way to the
people who most need it. Thus, CRA should encourage banks to
move beyond hanging educational posters at bank branches, and to
instead establish educational programs at grocery stores, libraries,
day care centers, senior citizens' centers, churches and other public
places. In addition, CRA should provide incentives to banks to
form partnerships with established community organizations and
entities that residents trust. These partnerships can play critical
roles in informing consumers.
CRA should also reward banks that evaluate ways in which their
lending and marketing practices might inhibit profitable lending to
LMI borrowers and then implement strategies to remove these in-
hibitions. For example, a bank might discover that the main reason
it is not originating loans in LMI neighborhoods is because it is not
familiar with the neighborhoods or the people who live there. 28
The bank could then undertake a study of the neighborhoods to
learn about the housing stock and the credit profile of the re-
sidents. If the investigation revealed promising markets for the
bank, it could stimulate an infusion of loan capital to the communi-
ties and generate the competition that is essential to drive out
predatory lenders.
Similarly, CRA should reward banks that evaluate and revise
their lending criteria to insure that they are not rejecting qualified
LMI borrowers. Banks use an array of different underwriting
guidelines to determine borrowers' eligibility for loans. These crite-
ria can lead to vastly divergent assessments of the credit risk that
tem, available at http://www.brook.edu/dybdocroot/es/urban/capitalxchange/arti-
clel0.htm (last visited April 10, 2002).
126. See Engel & McCoy, supra note 5, Section I.E.
127. To date, some of the most aggressive efforts by banks to market to LMI bor-
rowers have been a consequence of fair lending suits. The Department of Justice has
brought numerous actions against banks alleging that they engaged in racially discrim-
inatory lending practices. In consent decrees, banks have agreed to target marketing
efforts on African-American communities, work with African-American community
groups to determine the banking needs in their communities, and work with local real
estate agents in African-American communities. See Christina M. Gattuso, Fair Lend-
ing: Compliance After Chevy Chase, 10 REV. oF BANKING & FIN. SERVS. 141 (1994).
128. Robert B. Avery et al., CRA Special Lending Programs, 87 Fed. Res. Bull.
712, 722 (2000) (noting that the better the banks know their local markets and bor-
rowers, the less risky their portfolios).
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borrowers present. 129 For LMI borrowers, who are more likely to
be at the margin of eligibility, algorithms that falsely inflate their
risk level even slightly can preclude them from obtaining loans
from banks. When limitations in underwriting criteria lead banks to
reject creditworthy LMI borrowers, these borrowers may well turn
to predatory lenders.
It is possible and desirable for banks to test the predictability of
their underwriting criteria and, if necessary, to make adjustments
that would insure greater access of loan capital to LMI borrowers
without sacrificing profitability. 130 This could include devising
methods for evaluating the credit risks presented by borrowers
who have not participated in the credit economy or develop pro-
grams to help borrowers build credit records over time. For these
reasons, we recommend that CRA reward banks under the service
test if they undertake serious evaluations of their underwriting
standards to detect any standards that lead them to reject
creditworthy LMI borrowers and, if warranted, amend their under-
writing standards or business practices to eliminate unnecessary
hurdles to lending to these borrowers.
F. Predatory Lending by Non-bank Subsidiaries and Affiliates
of Banks and Independent Lenders
In an earlier section, we discussed the appropriate CRA re-
sponse to banks that finance subprime lending by other entities. In
this section, we consider whether the subprime activities of non-
bank mortgage affiliates of banks and/or independent mortgage
companies should be regulated directly under CRA.
Subprime activities by non-bank affiliates of banks do not un-
dergo CRA examinations unless their parent holding companies so
request. However, the Fed will review CRA protests about the
129. See M. Cary Collins, et al., The Influence of Bureau Scores, Customized Scores,
and Judgmental Review on the Bank Underwriting Decision-Making Process, in FED-
ERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, CHANGING FINANCIAL MARKETS AND COMMUNITY DEVEL-
OPMENT 103 (2001) (demonstrating that underwriting standards can generate
divergent estimates of default risk).
130. For example, North Dallas Bank & Trust works with a real estate developer to
offer home-purchase loans to Hispanic borrowers who would not qualify under tradi-
tional underwriting guidelines. The developer provides prospective buyers with a
home buying guide written in Spanish and offers free seminars on the home buying
process. The lender markets its loans through home buying fairs, churches and com-
munity groups. Thus far, all of the loans have been good quality and none have gone
to foreclosure. Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, Tapping an Untapped Market,
BANKING AND COMMUNITY PERSPECTIVES (Jan. 2, 2002), available at
www.dallasfed.org/htm/pubs/perspect/00_q-3.html.
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subprime operations of a non-bank affiliate in connection with a
bank holding company's application for a deposit facility. 131 Until
quite recently, that review has been cursory. Independent mort-
gage lenders are not subject to CRA in any form.
Extending CRA to subprime non-bank affiliates of banks would
mean mandatory CRA examinations and CRA ratings for all such
affiliates and possibly more probing investigations of those affili-
ates by the Fed in connection with applications for deposit facili-
ties. Extending CRA to independent subprime lenders would be
limited to mandatory CRA examinations and CRA ratings. 32
Extending CRA to non-bank subprime lenders has a certain sur-
face appeal. Doing so would penalize subprime lenders who cross
over the line into predatory practices. Furthermore, it would do so
across-the-board, and place all lenders on equal competitive foot-
ing with banks in terms of their CRA obligations. 133 Nevertheless,
we advise against extension of CRA to non-bank subprime lenders
of any sort. Our foremost concern is the political capital that
would be needed to expand the range of entities covered by CRA.
In the area of predatory lending, direct relief for victims is the
most pressing need, not CRA examinations or ratings. Aggrieved
borrowers need an effective cause of action for damages or rescis-
sion. 1 34 CRA does not afford that relief, however, because it does
not authorize private rights of action.1 35 Similarly, victims of pred-
atory lending need help in restructuring or refinancing their loans.
CRA does not provide that assistance. We believe that the time
and political capital needed for predatory lending reforms would
best be used in enacting direct relief for victims, not in extending
CRA, especially because sentiment in Congress runs deep against
any further expansion of CRA.136
131. We urge the Fed to continue those reviews with the level of detail seen in
Citigroup's application to acquire EAB. See Citigroup Inc., New York, N.Y., 87 Fed.
Res. Bull. 600 (Sept. 2001) (EAB); see also Citigroup Inc., New York, N.Y., 87 Fed.
Res. Bull. 613 (Sept. 2001) (Banamex).
132. The Fed does not review merger applications by independent lenders that do
not involve bank holding companies.
133. See PINSKY & THRELFALL, supra note 32, at 9.
134. Elsewhere, we have critiqued current remedies and proposed a federal cause
of action for breach of suitability that is designed to redress predatory loans. See gen-
erally Engel & McCoy, supra note 5.
135. See BANKING LAW MANUAL, supra note 7, § 8.03[1][b]; Kaimowitz v. Board of
Governors, 940 F.2d 610, 611-14 (11th Cir. 1991); Washington v. OCC, 856 F.2d 1507,
1509-12 (11th Cir. 1988).
136. In the negotiations leading up to passage of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of
1999, the Senate voted to exempt smaller depository institutions from CRA alto-
gether and to excuse institutions that qualified for safe harbor protection from routine
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Our second rationale harkens back to our earlier discussion of
the federal subsidy. 137 The traditional justifications for imposing
CRA obligations on regulated lenders, to the extent that they are
valid, are significantly weaker in the context of lending by non-
bank subsidiaries and affiliates, and independent mortgage compa-
nies that do not receive any direct federal subsidies.
It is true that non-bank affiliates and subsidiaries may receive
indirect benefits from the federal subsidy to banks. Thus, one
might argue that CRA should be extended to bank affiliates and
subsidiaries, but not to independent subprime lenders. Unfortu-
nately, such a piecemeal extension might well have the undesirable
effect of encouraging non-bank affiliates to exit subprime lending,
thereby relegating the field to unregulated mortgage lenders. Such
an outcome would be highly unfortunate. To be sure, subprime
lending by non-bank affiliates has not been free from abusive prac-
tices. Nevertheless, bank holding companies are subject to reputa-
tional and regulatory constraints that independent subprime
lenders do not face. For example, the fear of negative publicity
may be an incentive for bank holding companies to curb exploita-
tive lending practices by subprime affiliates. Similarly, the Ci-
tigroup/EAB case put bank holding companies on notice that
approval of their deposit facility applications will hinge on some
level of Fed scrutiny of subprime lending practices.
Finally, our proposal to sanction banks that directly or indirectly
support predatory lending will help deter institutions that are not
covered by CRA from originating predatory loans. The due dili-
gence and other requirements that we recommend imposing on
banks will make it difficult for non-CRA covered institutions to
obtain bank financing to support predatory lending. In sum, our
proposal accomplishes the same objective-deterring predatory
lending by non-bank affiliates and subsidiaries, and independent
mortgage companies-without extending CRA.
CONCLUSION
In this article, we sought to answer the question: given the surge
in predatory lending, what is the proper response of CRA? CRA
and federal subsidizes to regulated lenders can inadvertently facili-
tate predatory lending and, therefore, it is appropriate to harness
CRA examinations. Although these cuts were later restored in conference, they re-
flect the depth of opposition on the Hill toward CRA. See BANKING LAW MANUAL,
supra note 7, § 8.03[1], introduction.
137. See supra text accompanying notes 70-79.
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CRA to curtail predatory lending. Similarly, CRA, as it currently
is administered, fails to penalize banks that engage in predatory
lending, directly or indirectly.
We recommend that federal bank regulators use CRA to sanc-
tion behavior that could further predatory lending. For example,
regulators should deny both satisfactory and outstanding CRA rat-
ings to banks that fail to satisfy specific loan eligibility criteria de-
signed to counteract predatory lending when originating or
brokering subprime mortgages. Similarly, CRA ratings should
drop where banks finance subprime lenders-either through letters
of credit or working capital loans or purchases of subprime mort-
gages or interests in subprime securitizations-without instituting
adequate due diligence and monitoring safeguards against preda-
tory lending.
Conversely, we recommend that CRA be used to reward benefi-
cial conduct by banks designed to reduce predatory lending. For
example, increased CRA credit for legitimate subprime lending by
banks could inject badly needed healthy competition into the sub-
prime market. CRA credit should also be used to reward banks for
refinancing predatory loans with legitimate loans. Special market-
ing programs designed to offer legitimate credit to groups targeted
by predatory lenders likewise deserve CRA credit, as do innova-
tive underwriting guidelines for LMI borrowers.
Finally, we advise against extending CRA examinations and rat-
ings to non-bank subprime lenders, whether or not they are affili-
ated with banks. The traditional justification for applying CRA to
banks-as a quid pro quo for the federal safety net that banks en-
joy-is too attenuated outside of the bank context to apply to non-
bank lenders. Where subsidized funds at banks are financing pred-
atory lending by non-banks, our proposals to change the way that
CRA is administered at banks would cut off those subsidies at their
source. In addition, a campaign to extend CRA to non-bank lend-
ers would further waste political capital better used to enact direct
relief to victims of predatory lending.
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